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Although long known to hold energy reserves, it was not until the beginning ofthe 21st century that the extent of Mozambique’s natural gas resources came
to light with the discoveries of massive fields. Correspondingly, there was great
optimism that the development of the country’s hydrocarbons would prove
transformative. Despite the fact in 2013 of a supergiant gas discovery made in
Mozambique that is considered to be the second largest gas find in the world, the
African nation has struggled to benefit from this significant resource and translate
it into greater developmental achievements for the larger population. Additionally,
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this gas find is so sizeable that it is estimated that there is enough gas to fuel South
Africa for 150 to 200 years on its own.1 In essence, Mozambique’s natural gas has
the potential to be a true game changer, not just for the nation itself, but also for
meeting Africa’s regional energy needs. Yet the potential for squandering this
opportunity is a concern for many who fear that Mozambique may travel down the
same path of other commodity- and oil-rich African states that have failed to invest
the returns of a non-renewable resource into the renewable resource of its own
populace. Echoing this concern was the April 11, 2014 Radio France Inter-
national broadcast that asserted the discovery of natural gas in Mozambique
neither benefited the local population nor contributed to the economic growth of
the country, considered to be one of the poorest states in Sub-Saharan Africa.2
The argument seems to be in line with what P. Uetela emphasizes as a lack of
involvement and empowerment of the population, which is fundamental for
growth and change in Mozambique.3 The assumptions also are linked to the well-
publicized Radio France International broadcast suggesting there has been
a failure to invest the revenues from natural resources into other key sectors such
as education, infrastructure, industry, and agriculture. If this situation is not
corrected, the broadcast claimed, the gas industry would perpetually lead the
country to higher levels of poverty—a situation akin to that of Angola, Chad, and
Nigeria, where natural resources have contributed to continuous strife and civil
wars. Indeed, in her contribution to the Journal of Democracy, E. Azevedo-
Harman, a member of the Scientific Council and Professor at the Catholic
University of Mozambique, recently noted that “Mozambique, as it appears, has
joined the ranks of those countries that live in severe poverty while the spectre
and promise of wealth loom before them.”4 In contrast, the few studies on the gas
sector suggest that it has been growth enhancing (M. Parker and H. Kreuze,
G. Melina and Y. Xiong, and J. Demierre et al.), in spite of concerns by others
about transparency (see, for example, the works of D. Nombora).5 In turn, one
wonders what kinds of transformation have been sparked by the natural gas
industry in Mozambique.
Recent discoveries of natural gas in Africa have generated much attention for
the continent and animated the debate about the precise impact of fossil fuel de-
velopment on the economy, society, and environment. While the ramifications of
such discoveries for the mature and declining resource economies of Nigeria,
Gabon, and Chad, among others, have been extensively discussed (e.g., J. Heilbrunn),
many questions have been asked of the emerging producers such as Mozambique.6
Most questions are framed around the “resource curse” thesis, which emphasizes
whether gas resources will enhance or limit economic growth. Or, in its classical
formulation, whether using windfall revenues for social services is good for
society and the economy given that such social expenditures are unsustainable.7
It is in this heated debate that the Mozambican authorities have found them-
selves. Should the state intervene or allow the market to operate and the people to
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find their own “level” in this “free” market process? Should gas be regarded as
a mere export earner or should it be used to promote linkages and industrialization?8
As one of the poorest countries in Africa, the “Mozambican resource dilemma”
requires urgent attention and consideration.
However, it is useful to step back and examine how questions of resource
impacts are framed. What if, instead of utilizing the “resource curse” framework,
we use a different framework, one which recognizes that in a resource abundant
economy there can be both propitious and deleterious outcomes? What if, instead
of studying only growth, we study socio-economic transformation? This revised
analytical frame has been used elsewhere in Africa (F. Obeng-Odoom) and, in
the case of Mozambique, at least J. Kirshner and M. Power have suggested that
such new questions hold much promise.9 In turn, they considered not only the
“resource curse” but a triad of infrastructure networks, enclave spaces developed
by resources, and resulting urbanization. Authoritative reviews of the literature
(see, for example, T. Kinnaman and J. M. Barth) show that this more “hands-on,”
fluid, and institutionalist approach has much backing in the global literature,
given the complexities of the effects of gas development on the economy, so-
ciety, and environment and the information paucity that can plague nascent re-
source economies.10 This approach has the added advantages of breaking away
from the strictures of the neoclassical economics framework of the “resource
curse.”
The aim of this article is to extend the state of analysis on the impacts of gas
development in Mozambique by evaluating the relationship between the gas
sector, the Mozambican economy, and social change. As the resource curse
framework is only limited to economic growth, this work utilizes two alternative
frameworks—the Staples approach11 and the Linkages approach12—that are
melded into an institutional analysis, looking simultaneously at “benefits, costs,
and uncertainties”13 or “blessings, uncertainties, and curses,”14 and used to con-
ceptualize progress more widely to include not only growth, but other externalities
and broader social change as applied to the case of Mozambique.
In so doing, the evidence suggests that the natural gas industry in Mozambique
has contributed to both the expansion in economic growth and social change.
However, the positive experience with social change arises from direct in-
tervention and not necessarily the result of the related economic growth. Indeed, in
the process of economic growth, the production and export of natural gas in
Mozambique have raised the possibility of major socio-economic and ecological
dangers. Contrary to the theoretical criticism of spending windfall revenues on
social services as wasteful,15 we argue that only strategic social and ecological
expenditures of gas revenues can provide and increase the chances of the gas
industry becoming transformational economically, socially, and ecologically.
The article is organized as follows; the next section deals with conceptualizing
the paper and describing the sources of data. This is followed by sections that
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present the results, a discussion of those results, and conclusions and policy im-
plications from the study.
Methodology
The way we understand resource experiences is heavily dependent on our
disciplines and conceptual frameworks, which, in turn, influence our methods of
data collection. There are multiple theoretical frameworks utilized by diverse
disciplines such as sociology (A. Giddens, R. Freudenburg, and D. Davidson and
R. Dunlap), the field of anthropology (T. Richardson and G. Weszkalnys, F. Boas,
and A. Radcliffe-Brown), economic geography (M. Arias et al.) and those with
foundations in economics.16 Classified according to orientation, however, three
main approaches to understanding resource impacts have been used across these
disciplines. They range from resource curse to the enclave thesis to social disruption.
The most common approach is the resource curse framework. Underpinning
this concept is the expectation that a resource boom usually leads to many eco-
nomic (e.g., inflation, deindustrialization), social (e.g., corruption, conflict), and
environmental (e.g., pollution, destruction of natural habitat) problems. It used
to be most commonly utilized by classical economists and later by neoclassical
academics and professional economists for whom the key concerns were eco-
nomic issues related to economic growth. However, the adoption and adapta-
tion by other social scientists have broadened the resource curse framework to
include questions of ecology and distribution (see, for economic explanation,
M. Bordo and J. Cairnes, The Economist, W. Corden and P. Neary, and X. Sala-i-
Martin and A. Subramanian, and for a broader explanation, J. Goodman and
D. Worth and F. Obeng-Odoom).17
The enclave and social disruption thesis can be regarded as similar in many
respects to that of the resource curse in the sense it too posits a negative re-
lationship between resource booms and socio-economic and environmental ills as
M. Lawrie et al. state.18 That being said, the mechanisms by which the negative
experience is established vary. Enclave analysts tend to stress economic processes,
typically noting that resource booms generate benefits but that these are con-
centrated only in one aspect of the economy without supporting other economic
sectors. Social disruption theories offer more sociological-based explanations
about community and societal breakdowns due to sudden changes and anti-social
behavior induced by resource booms. W. Freudenburg has been identified with
this theory.19
Over the years, these frameworks have been found to have limitations. A
common criticism of all is that they are quite insular, focusing mainly on the
nation-state rather than the nation-state as part of the world system in which
capitalism is the ruling mode of production. As a result, external factors and
drivers of “impacts” have tended to be overlooked. Also discounted, especially in
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the dominant resource curse framework, are the diversity, difference, and differ-
entiation of impacts for property relations over different time periods during which
resources are emerging, maturing, or declining. The binary choice of “blessing” or
“curse” oversimplifies the analyses demonstrated by M. Lawrie et al. and
F. Obeng-Odoom.20 According to L. Fioramonti, these criticisms tend to lead to
broader (e.g., introducing a temporal dimension) but similarly growth-centric
alternatives, which makes this framework inappropriate for use in Africa, a con-
tinent where growth has bypassed the majority of people and is particularly in-
appropriate.21 An alternative, embracing important aspects of some of these
frameworks while eschewing their confounding features, is required. Such
a framework should make contradictions central to explanation and be sensitive to
tensions—locally, nationally, and internationally—while taking into account the
nature of the underlying economic system.22
As F. Cooper has recently advocated, in studying Africa the continent’s place
in the capitalist system and the world ought to be part of the analysis.23 Regulatory
approaches also may contribute to the analysis. Specifically, this approach
simultaneously relates “benefits, costs, and uncertainties”24 or “blessings, un-
certainties, and curses”25 to (a) examine why capitalism persists in spite of inherent
and severe crises, (b) explain why oil and gas remain core to capitalism in spite of
all the interest about developing alternative fuels, (c) demonstrate the centrality of
the wage relation or workers and their relationship to capitalists to the continuing
dependence on oil (how work is separated from home and, hence, how workers
become dependent on the automobile), and (d) the centrality of ecological crisis in
capitalism.26 While used to great success in the United States,27 in the Mozambican
case information about the gas industry is so sparse28 that, at this stage, there are
not enough data to do a careful Marxian analysis.
Given these circumstances, a descriptive-prescriptive framework can work
better. The best methodology for the gas sector will be to combine the Staples
approach pioneered by Innis and the linkages approach developed by Hirschman.
Innis’ Staples thesis, widely discussed by M. Watkins, is one effective way to
explain the oil-growth-socio-economic transformation nexus.29 The key features
of this approach entail carefully studying the specific characteristics of oil as
a resource, knitting these into the fabric of impacts, and cautiously describing how
these characteristics and impacts are related and combined and, thus, how these
can be taken into account in oil policy making.30 In this approach, the analyst looks
for characteristics of the resource and then tries to establish the spread effects of
the oil and gas sector, which stimulate the growth of interlinked industries to
supply inputs (backward linkages) and make use of outputs from the oil industry
(forward linkages). From this perspective, oil production unleashes economic
effects that link together booming and lagging sectors to improve the overall social
conditions of the oil economy.31 The oil and gas industries tend to stimulate a wide
range of economic activities that, in turn, additionally are carried out to process the
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outputs of the oil industry. In practice, “the most important example of backward
linkage is the building of transport systems for collection of the staple, for that can
have further and powerful spread effects.”32
These activities employ a large work force whose purchases and taxes further
enhance economic activities and generate revenues for the state. Most of such
activities require energy to run and, hence, they boost the demand for oil and other
energy sources. All these lead to a process that tends to drive economic growth
as P. Alagidede observed.33 However, beyond growth, the process is economic
development-inducing because it generates outcomes that can be diffused in the
economy for inclusive progress. Despite this, even if the activities do not impact
substantial aspects of the economy, Staples analysts would argue that revenues
from backward and forward linkages can be invested in social and economic
support services to spread the benefits of economic growth.
A. Hirschman et al. furthered this idea of interdependent economic processes
into a stronger concept of “linkages.”34 Hirschman considered Innis’ effort too
“descriptive” because the industrial linkages form a bridge from underdevelopment
to economic development through unbalanced but sequential industrialization. In
both the 1958 and 1984 Hirschman works the argument put forth is that the eco-
nomic development process is set in motion by industries that trigger a series of
interdependent activities leading to linkages—either forward or backward—with
a preference for the establishment of industries that had the potential of unleashing
further industrialization.35 It is not surprising that the construction and infrastructure
industries were favored because of their ability to augment capital formation and
generate revenues. Hirschman’s later work encouraged linkages analysis, particu-
larly fiscal linkages, to enable the state to obtain revenues for re-investment in other
linkage-generating industries.36
Backward linkages are those inputs and support facilities that are constructed to
serve the oil industry, so Hirschman called them “input-provision effects.”37 In this
sense, economic processes such as construction of roads, housing, hospitals, and
hospitality facilities are all considered backward linkages. Forward linkages, on
the other hand, are those facilities for which the oil sector provides inputs. In
Hirschman’s words, they are “output-utilisation effects.”38 Such facilities are
accompanied by construction-related activities of their own. For instance, re-
fineries that are set up come along with housing for the refineries staff. Other
small industries may be built to support refinery operation. Some of these con-
struction activities are related to the backward linkages but others are distinct.
Industries that support oil drilling may differ from those set up to utilize oil
products, but they are both related to the ramifications that oil development has
on the economy.
The approach adopted here gives a more positive role to the state. Unlike the
neoclassical approach in which the state is encouraged to pursue only monetary
and fiscal policies39 or simply allow the market to flourish,40 this approach
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encourages a greater role for the state aimed at driving inclusive economic
development.
The data used for the analysis are secondary. They are derived from reports
prepared by independent analysts, the government, and the gas company. They are
taken from a variety of documents such as national plans, official releases, and
speeches.
Results
According to the Capstone Report, the discovery of natural gas in Mozambique
goes back to the early 1960s although it was only in the 2000s that its devel-
opment began in earnest in the southern province of Inhambane.41 Gas pro-
duction began in 2004 and, despite its sizeable reserves, the nation is still
deemed as an emerging gas producer.42 There are three reasons that have been
offered by D. Ledesma for the recent successful discovery of gas in Mozambique
and other countries: technical, economic, and political factors.43 Technically,
more advanced science and technology has now been developed. Economi-
cally, the demand for fossil fuel coupled with growing insecurity in the countries
traditionally associated with gas production makes Africa a solid production
choice. Politically, the improved situation on the continent and, in particular
for Mozambique, which had suffered from war and civil strife in the 1970s and
1980s, has led to new discoveries. Following the Mozambican civil war,
which intensified during the mid- and late 1980s, the political situation on the
ground stabilized, thus paving the way for more serious and sustained energy
exploration.44
As a result, the last two decades (1995–2015) have seen more external investor
interest in Mozambique. There are two additional reasons for this recent successful
gas development. First, the emergence of Sasol Limited45 company in 2002 in
Temane-Inhambane city, a region possessing an estimated 3.5 trillion cubic feet
(tcf) of reserves of natural gas, and, second, the joint development efforts by both
U.S. and Italian companies, namely, Anadarko Petroleum Corporation46 and Eni,47
respectively, which are responsible for the current discoveries in the Rovuma
basin in the northern city of Mozambique-Pemba.48
To date, the two leading companies have produced an estimated 4.200 billion
cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas in the Rovuma basin alone. This record confirms
the findings in the SPTEC Advisory country report that Mozambique could be-
come the world’s third largest exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG) based on
assessments by Anadarko Petroleum Corporation.49
Moreover, the dominant global concern about Mozambique is that, once its gas
reserves are fully developed, the nation could be positioned as one of the largest
producers of LNG in Africa. Based on natural gas reserve estimates, by 2012
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Mozambique was being hailed as the emerging new giant in natural gas.50 This
was the period when Anadarko Petroleum Corporation and Eni announced
a 100-tcf natural gas discovery with an additional 150 tcf potential, increasing
the number to a staggering 250 tcf of both potential and already discovered re-
serves. Thus, the prospects of Mozambique becoming a significant natural gas
producing hub in Africa are high. Figure 1 highlights Mozambique’s position
relative to other nations based upon proved natural gas reserves. It shows that
Mozambique ranks 13th in a list of the top 15 global gas reserve holders
according to 2015 figures from the U.S. Department of Energy’s Energy In-
formation Administration.
Thus, Mozambique holds quite a prominent position in the league of gas
producers. Figure 2 is an annotated diagram showing the geographical location of
major gas-producing areas in the country. These are mainly located in Temane-
Inhambane in the south and Rovuma in the north.
Investment related to natural gas is anticipated to be sizeable in Mozambique.
For the next decade, investment in natural gas is expected to be $66 billion and
Figure 1
MOZAMBIQUE IN THE TOP 15 NATIONS BASED UPON PROVED NATURAL GAS
RESERVES, 2015
(proved reserves of natural gas in trillion cubic feet–tcf)
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Proved Reserves of Natural Gas 2015
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, 2016).
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Figure 2
GENERAL DISTRIBUTION OF NATURAL RESOURCES IN MOZAMBIQUE
Source: National Petroleum Institute of Mozambique, “Map of Concessions” April 8, 2016,
available at http://www.inp.gov.mz/pt/Mapas/Mapa-de-Concessoes.
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between $200 and $400 billion over the next four decades.51Thus, given the
magnitude of these investments, there are some important prospects both from an
economic and societal perspective that require further discussion.
Discussion
The discovery and proliferation of new reserves have proven to be a potential
driver for economic growth in Mozambique; however, there seem to be different
figures for the precise contribution of the gas sector to the national economy. For
example, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) reports that in the
year 2000 total receipts in taxes from the hydrocarbon industries in Mozambique
was about $24 million, which ranged between 1 to 2 percent of total national
revenue of the country. In 2009, the gas companies paid a similar amount in taxes.
The contribution of the gas industry to gross domestic product (GDP) was 1 to 1.7
percent around 2012/early 2013 and was expected to increase to 13 percent over
the following six years.52 Some limited evidence suggests that the increase is
a possibility: “in 2013, contracts to explore the Rovuma region for gas were
bringing the government in Maputo an amount worth more than 4 percent of
GDP.”53 The resource specialists in the country predict that Mozambique is likely
to obtain revenues of some U.S. $115 billion from gas exports between 2020 and
2040 alone, subject to further technical work by the gas companies.54
According to the Mozambican Ministry of Natural Resources, the industry will
contribute 13 percent to the GDP of the country in the next few decades.55 Fur-
thermore, the Capstone Project highlights that the commercialization of gas
already has led to a 7.5-percent increase in the GDP of the country and boosted
financial activity, commerce, communication, transport, and construction.56 It
appears that the gas industry was key in enabling the country as a whole to reach
a 7.2-percent average growth in a 10-year period.57 Others seem to corroborate the
figures offered by the Capstone Project. For instance, M. Parker and H. Kreuze
note that “Mozambique has shown high annual GDP growth rates in the last years
with an average of 7.2% between 2001 and 2011 due to its low starting level and
its large natural resource endowment” [emphasis added].58 These figures are clear
evidence that the gas reserves not only benefit the inhabitants of the main cities
where gas is being developed but also the country as a whole—even if the levels of
that benefit vary.
Indeed, economists in the country59 seem to dispute many of these figures,
signaling that the Mozambican “growth story” is still a cautionary tale. Elsewhere in
Africa, similar questions about GDP calculations have been raised but so, too, have
questions about the social processes that lead to GDP expansion and those expe-
riences that are excluded from GDP calculations as F. Obeng-Odoom observed.60
Currently, the preliminary evidence in Mozambique suggests that ecological
degradation and social marginalization are quite central to the same process of
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accumulation that generates growth. One hundred thousand people have been
displaced but it appears that the process of compensation and resettlement has
been effective to date with the endorsement of civil society groups, although it
is still unclear as to how the people who have been resettled actually feel about
the process.61 Nevertheless, there remain socially precarious challenges to be
addressed.
While a few women have found some jobs in gas-related activities, most seem
to have been particularly disadvantaged in this growth success. This is brought
into sharp focus because theDraft Natural Gas Master Plan pays some attention to
environmental concerns, but no attention to gender-related impacts.62 In many
cases, the global oil and gas industry is viewed as undermining and marginalizing
women by exploiting their domestic labor to support men. In turn, when men
celebrate economic windfalls, women tend to only witness greater dependence as
they lack access to the industry or, when they access it, they are made to feel
inferior or given limited support relative to men.63
These are particularly worrisome because of the absence of (a) regulations, (b)
formal regulatory agencies to implement and monitor regulations, even when the
regulations are enacted, and (c) civil society groups and media networks that will
hold actors to account, publicize any mishaps, and give voice to persons and
groups who might miss out of the industry.
From an economic perspective, while the domestic demand for gas in Mozam-
bique is expected to increase, it is currently quite small. As of 2011, it was only
0.5 billion cubic meters per year and most of this demand arose from Maputo
and Beira.64 Therefore, it appears that the linkages arising from gas have been
rather weak.
These issues require direct policy attention. International evidence from Brazil
shows that merely assuming greater economic growth will have a “trickle down”
effect that naturally address these concerns is unlikely to work. In analyzing the
experience of Brazil, F. Fernandes once argued that industrializing the country
would eradicate social inequalities.65 However, numerous studies published in the
Brazilian Journal of Political Economy have shown the opposite: the more the
country has industrialized, the worse social inequalities have become.
Political economists tend to argue that the social economy requires direct
support. Certainly, in the case of Mozambique, even the meagre U.S. $1 million
(on average) that the hydrocarbon company of Mozambique has been investing in
social projects in gas-producing regions has yielded notable results. This is sup-
ported by the evidence that companies such as Sasol have initiated investments in
corporate social projects estimated at U.S. $13 million, and primarily focuses on
infrastructure development with 67 percent.66 Additional fields of Sasol’s corpo-
rate investments with special emphasis for social projects include provision and
maintenance of schools, health clinics, water boreholes, and water systems. The
company has set as its main goal to leverage skills development, education, and
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capacity building of the citizens through the education value chain—this is out-
lined by both Sasol and Mozambique LNG as components of their social
investment programs in the country.67 Even though there are additional social
investment plans for improving health facilities, community investment programs,
regional development initiatives, and philanthropy, history has shown in that in
hydrocarbon-rich environments it has often been difficult to translate these types
of programs into longer lasting and self-sustaining gains.
The Natural Gas Master Plan for Mozambique summed up the impact of
natural gas on social development in the country as follows:
Natural gas resources are developed in a manner that maximizes benefits to Mozambique
society by supporting: growth in domestic public and private sector institutional competen-
cies; growth in domestic industry and business, especially small and medium scale industries;
increased employment across the country especially in the less developed provinces; in-
frastructure to support expanded economic activities especially in less developed provinces;
and expand access to training and education in order to improve the quality of life for the
people of Mozambique; while minimizing adverse social and environmental impacts.
68
In addition, the same report provides an overview of the scale of local gas use,
which is still very low in relation to the overall gas supply:
Raw gas is processed through the central processing facility (CPF) in Temane with a capacity
of about 147 million GJ per year (about 400,000 GJ/day). A small distribution network was
developed in Inhambane province, providing gas supply to several localities totaling less
than 200.000 GJ per year (about 550 GJ per day). In 2010, production from Temane was 125
million GJ, of which 118 GJ were exported.
69
Those are some of the social benefits of gas development and there are others
worth mentioning. Currently, 50 percent of gas produced in Mozambique is
exported to South Africa in return for foreign exchange, while the remainder is
consumed domestically to meet local energy needs.70 In addition to consuming
natural gas directly, it can be used for electricity generation. On December 12,
2014, the national radio of Mozambique reported that the National Hydrocarbon
Company of Mozambique (ENH) was offering natural gas to the Electricity
Company of Mozambique (EDM). The electricity company uses this natural gas
to produce power, which tends to benefit urban dwellers, especially those in
cities such as Maputo, Inhambane, and Pemba, but has the potential to be more
widely consumed. An estimated 400 families have reportedly benefitted from
other projects initiated by the ENH, particularly in Temane-Inhambane city, one
of the sites were the first reserves were discovered in southern Mozambique. The
ENH, in coordination with the companies that produce gas in Mozambique, has
developed other social projects in areas where natural gas has been discovered,
contributing to the development through education, health services, and access
to water and sanitation.
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Together, the evidence may serve as a reminder of what direct positive in-
tervention can do, but it may not be the complete story. We do not yet know what
local residents think of the gas company, whether the company incorporates the
views of local residents, and in what ways livelihoods have changed since the start
of gas production. Employment in the industry remains extremely low, increasing
from 2 to 22 workers in the last 13 years at the Mozambican Hydrocarbon
Company. Some 3,800 jobs generated in the industry are from five of the leading
gas projects only. Taking into account the employment in the industry as a whole,
it seems the total number of jobs in the gas sector will be only 6,000 in total—a
reminder that this sector is considered to be more capital intensive in nature and
not labor intensive.71 These are matters that warrant a fuller assessment of
“accumulation by dispossession” and, hence, will engage the attention of future
researchers.72
There are other topics that require further research. Energy provision is one
such area of emphasis. The gas industry can help meet the domestic energy needs
in five ways. First, the cost of energy might fall over the years so that people will
spend less on energy and, thus, result in substantial savings. Second, access to
energy is expected to expand to populations that hitherto did not have regular and
affordable access. Third, overall industrial activities are expected to benefit by
obtaining more reliable energy access and paying less for energy, thereby pro-
ducing more in output. Fourth, the government is expected to spend less on energy
subsidies that, in turn, would increase potential revenues for expenditures on other
social services. Indeed, through the export of energy, the government can obtain
more revenue to invest in the education and health sectors.
However, experiences from the North African gas sector show that Mozam-
bique will have to tread cautiously in separating gas from other energy sources. Its
energy policy can integrate the various energy sources to provide a mix of energy
options. Questions about gas pipeline disputes, increasing domestic use, subsidies
and how they can lead to the sale of gas elsewhere for a profit, and the possibility
that suppliers, instead of investing in Mozambique, would prefer to sell outside for
a greater profit are all areas that require further study. An alternative model that
could be studied is that of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s no export/no import gas
policy and the implications for such a policy in the case of Mozambique, which
would curtail the development of gas for local use only.73
Conclusion and Policy Implications
While the gas industry seems to have contributed to driving growth and social
development, the linkages between the industry and the rest of the economy or the
processes of economic development are quite weak. At present, there is no
guarantee that social inequalities will be attenuated through gas projects. The lack
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of clear policies against exploitation is a major challenge as is the lack of
guidelines to shape the relationship among donors, investors, and local authorities.
However, were it willing, the state could do more. While it has provided
a local content law and imposed a quota on foreign employees (Decree No. 63/2011)
to enhance the employment prospects of locals,74 evidence from elsewhere in
Africa75 shows that such jobs can be (a) few, relative to expectations; (b) beneficial
only to people who live far away from the realities of local residents and create
a transient work force with much antagonism between such workers and local
residents; (c) precarious and menial; and (d) biased in favor of men. In such cases,
widespread inequalities are likely to develop among Mozambicans and between
those Mozambicans who work in the industry and the minority expatriate workers.
The Mozambican authorities can go even further not only in defining but also in
implementing and monitoring a gender-sensitive resource-based job creation, de-
veloping an employment model that progressively increases the power and control
of workers in terms of the nature of their participation in the production process,
decision making about allocating economic surplus, and responsible financial
management roles.76
The energy companies can contribute more in a revised policy orientation.
While Mozambique currently has a petroleum production tax (pegged at 6 percent
of the value/price of the gas in the month in which it is produced) and royalty
regimes (pegged at 2 to 15 percent of the value of gas, the specifics determined by
the Council of Ministers), the 5-year exemptions (fiscal benefits to attract in-
vestors to Mozambique) granted to gas companies can be amended to enhance the
revenue stream of the national government.77 Taxes can be levied on windfalls and
the rents accruing to landlords whose properties appreciate in value arising from
social investments, population growth, and speculation. The advantage of this land
tax, often called a “Georgist tax,” is that it will remove or ameliorate spatial, wealth,
and income inequalities, discourage speculative behavior, and generate public
revenues that can be directed toward social programs. Such a policy has been used
for propitious ends in the United States and elsewhere.78 However, Mozambique
needs to be cautious in the implementation process as there is no guarantee that what
worked in the United States might also be effective in this context.
It is also possible, if not desirable, for the authorities to develop the country’s
refining capacity. Currently, Mozambique imports all its refined oil products,
including gasoline. In 2011, this import bill amounted to over $870 million, so if it
develops its refinery capacity the country can make major savings and generate
more gas to be refined for use locally or for export. These advantages are echoed in
the plans of Oilmoz to develop a refinery near Maputo. It is estimated that this
planned refinery will generate 17,000 jobs during its construction phase (15,000
temporary jobs) and when the facility is operational (2,000 permanent jobs).
Another refinery, Ayr Petro Nacala Refinery, is also to be developed with the help
of the Saudi authorities.79 These refineries are likely to generate further linkages.
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On the entire African continent, there are only 44 refineries and, apart from Kenya
and South Africa, there appears to be no major refinery in the Southern and
Eastern African regions.80 So, the development of these refineries can create
linkages not only within but also between Mozambique and the rest of Africa and
the world, preparing the grounds for energy democracy and self-sufficiency.
A fourth area in need of policy attention is the environment, which is critical at
every stage in the process be it in exploring for more gas, storage, transport, or
sale. Even in refining, residents in refinery towns encounter greater negative ex-
ternalities and environmental pollution, as many international studies have
shown.81 Yet, in Mozambique, environmental aspects have tended to be pigeon-
holed into “environmental impact assessment” and rules applicable at the start of
gas projects.82 While some of these lines of enquiry and policy making may look
utopian, the dystopian reality of the status quo will not deliver on key goals either.
The contradictions of resource development in the Mozambican case be they
“benefits, costs, and uncertainties”83 or “blessings, uncertainties, and curses”84
play out in bouts of accumulation and troughs of marginalization. The pressures
are limited at this stage, but they might be attenuated by promoting strong state-led
intersectoral linkages and connections among economy, society, and the envi-
ronment. In doing so, the specific characteristics of gas as an exhaustible natural
resource must be taken into account for long-term future planning. It is early days
yet to see how the Mozambican authorities will work this out, but much will also
depend on an alert media and civil society groups focusing not only on the nation-
state, but also on the underlying mode of production and the interconnections with
the world system. The task is to seek reasonable accumulation without dispos-
session or limited and declining dispossession in a regime oriented to growth and
change, social progress, and energy sufficiency.
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